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and system of  language that following generations infer often 
diff er from the system earlier generations are using. Th is often 
results in  semantic change, syntactic change , and sound 
change. 
 – Albert  Atkin 
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 ABSOLUTE AND STATISTICAL UNIVERSALS 
 Language universals are statements that are true of all lan-
guages; for example, “all languages have stop consonants.” But 
beneath this simple defi nition lurks deep ambiguity, and this 
triggers misunderstanding in both interdisciplinary discourse 
and within linguistics itself. A core dimension of the ambiguity 
is captured by the opposition “absolute versus statistical uni-
versal,” although the literature uses these terms in varied ways. 
Many textbooks draw the boundary between absolute and statis-
tical according to whether a sample of languages contains excep-
tions to a universal. But the notion of an exception-free sample 
is not very revealing, even if the sample contained all known 
languages: Th ere is always a chance that an as yet undescribed 
language, or an unknown language from the past or future, will 
provide an exception. 
 It is impossible, in principle, to survey all languages of our spe-
cies. If we nevertheless want to make claims about all languages, 
only two routes are open: a priori deduction of necessarily true 
statements or statistical extrapolation from empirical samples to 
the entire set. Absolute universals can then be defi ned as those 
that are necessarily true, statistical universals as those that are 
extrapolated from samples. 
 Absolute Universals 
 For statements to be necessarily true, they must follow from a 
priori assumptions. Th e assumptions that linguists make are 
diverse and heavily debated. An example is the assumption that 
 words consist of  morphemes , that is, minimal form-mean-
ing pairs. If one accepts this, then it is necessarily true that all 
languages have morphemes, and there cannot be exceptions. 
Why? Suppose someone claims to have discovered a language 
without morphemes. One can of course simply analyze the lan-
guage without mentioning morphemes, but obviously that can-
not challenge the universal just because one can always defend 
it by reanalyzing the language  with morphemes.  Th e only true 
challenge would be to show that analyzing some data in terms 
of morphemes leads to structures that are in confl ict with other 
assumptions, for example, that form-meaning pairs combine 
exclusively by linear concatenation.  Th e confl ict can be  illustrated 
by languages with  morphologies like the English plural  geese , 
where the meanings  plural and  goose do not correspond to linear 
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 ABDUCTION 
 Abduction is a form of reasoning fi rst explicated by the nine-
teenth-century philosopher  C. S. Peirce. Th e central concept 
he wishes to introduce is that of generating new hypotheses to 
explain observed phenomena partly by guesswork or specu-
lation. In his early work, Peirce tried to explain abductive rea-
soning, as distinct from deductive and inductive reasoning, by 
reference to syllogistic form. For instance, the following schema 
is an example of deductive reasoning:
 All the beans in the bag are white 
 Th ese beans came from this bag 
 Th erefore, these beans are white 
 Th is is distinct from inductive reasoning which, Peirce argues, 
follows this pattern:
 Th ese beans came from this bag 
 Th ese beans are white 
 Th erefore, all the beans in this bag are white 
 And both these forms are distinct from abductive reasoning 
which, Peirce argues, follows this pattern:
 Th ese beans are white 
 All the beans in this bag are white 
 Th erefore, the beans came from this bag 
 In later work, however, Peirce felt that trying to fi t abduc-
tive reasoning into such a strict syllogistic form was restric-
tive, and instead he opted for the following schema to explain 
abduction: 
 Th e surprising fact C is observed 
 But if A were true, C would be a matter of course 
 Hence, there is a reason to suspect that A is true. 
 (Peirce  1935 , 189) 
 For example, suppose I observe that my car will not start. 
One good explanation for this would be that it is out of fuel. 
Consequently, it seems that we have a good reason to think that 
my car’s refusal to start is due to its being out of fuel. Of course, 
we may very quickly discover that my car has plenty of fuel, 
and a diff erent hypothesis must be adopted, but Peirce always 
intended that abductive reasoning was fallible and conjectural, 
awaiting confi rmation from other testing. 
 Peirce’s account of abduction has been widely adopted in 
the philosophy of science, but it has also been of some interest 
to linguists. One particularly prominent use of abduction has 
been in  historical linguistics  for explaining  language 
change (see, for instance, Anderson  1973 ). Th e systematic 
features of a language that govern the use of one generation 
are opaque to the following generation as they acquire that lan-
guage – the only access is through language output. It appears, 
then, that following generations must use abductive inferences 
to access the rules of language before applying those rules to 
new cases . And, of course, since abduction is fallible, the rules 
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